Unfair Discrimination or Necessary for Equal Opportunity? The ECJ Upholds Positive Action in Lommers v. Minister Van Landbouw by Mitchell, Brady
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2004
Unfair Discrimination or Necessary for Equal
Opportunity? The ECJ Upholds Positive Action in
Lommers v. Minister Van Landbouw
Brady Mitchell
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brady Mitchell, Unfair Discrimination or Necessary for Equal Opportunity? The ECJ Upholds Positive Action in Lommers v. Minister Van
Landbouw, 26 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 469 (2004).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol26/iss3/6
Unfair Discrimination or Necessary for Equal
Opportunity? The ECJ Upholds Positive
Action in Lommers v. Minister Van
Landbouw
I. INTRODUCTION
Picture the following scenario: One female and one male employee
would each like to use their company's nursery facility for their
children. Without any further questions being asked, the company
grants the female employee full access to the nursery. The male
employee, on the other hand, meets a much different result-he is
turned away because he cannot prove that he has the responsibility of
taking care of his children by himself. Two different employees, two
different genders, and two different standards. Is this approach
consistent with the European Union's guidelines on equal treatment of
the sexes? This question was the focus of Lommers v. Minister van
Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, a recent European Court of
Justice (ECJ) case brought by a male employee against his employer.
The dispute at issue in Lommers originated when the plaintiff's
employer enacted a rule which provided that only female employees
could use the workplace's nursery for their children. Only in the case of
emergency were the children of male employees allowed access to the
nursery. H. Lommers, a male employee of the company, filed suit on
the grounds that the company's program violated an EU directive which
mandated equal treatment for men and women in the workplace. The
ECJ held that the program did not violate EU regulations because
another EU directive allowed for discriminatory laws designed to
further equal opportunity in the workplace.2
The ECJ followed the established law in the area of gender
equality, but in doing so it failed to fully consider important public
1. Case C-476/99, Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (E.C.J.,
Mar. 19, 2002), at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/aide/index.htm.
2. Id. 9, 11, 20, 50, at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/aide/index.htm.
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policy implications. The ECJ's decision will produce minimal benefits
but will bring about significant harm. It will perpetuate the viewpoint
that child care is a woman's responsibility, a view which will curtail
women's opportunities in the workplace. Thus, the ECJ has created a
dynamic that has a detrimental impact on women's rights and runs afoul
of the EU's directive on gender equality. In short, the ECJ should have
paid greater attention to public policy concerns and struck down the
employer's gender-biased rule as violative of EU law.
This Note aims to present an overview of the factors that gave rise
to the case and to analyze whether the ECJ reached the correct decision.
Part II discusses much of the key background information in the case,
the circumstances surrounding the EU's formation, the ECJ's role
within the framework of the EU, the EU directives at issue in this case,
and the case law illustrating the ECJ's interpretation of these directives.
Part III delves into all aspects of Lommers: the national law that spurred
the conflict with the EU, the parties' litigation history, and the ECJ's
ultimate holding in the case. Part IV discusses the ECJ's holding and
examines it relative to legal and public policy standards. In this section,
an argument is set forth that the ECJ violated EU law by relying
primarily on legal precedent and not focusing on public policy concerns
to a sufficient extent.
II. BACKGROUND
A. European Union
On February 7, 1992, twelve European nations signed the
Maastrict Treaty, which established the EU.3 Three more nations joined
in 1995, bringing EU membership to its current level of fifteen member
states.4
The EU comprises five governing bodies: the European
Commission (Commission), the Council of the European Union, the
European Parliament, the European Court of Auditors, and the ECJ. 5
Although the five governing bodies of the EU perform specific roles,
3. P.S.R.F. Mathijsen, A Guide to European Union Law 3 (7th ed. 1999).
4. Carson W. Clements, Note, A More Perfect Union? Eastern Enlargement and the
Institutional Challenges of the Czech Republic's Accession to the European Union, 29 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & CoM. 401, 410 (2002). Austria, Finland, and Sweden entered the EU in 1995. They
joined the original twelve member states-Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Id.
5. Paul Libretta, Note, The Economic and Monetary Union: A Standards or Rules-Based
Institution?, 29 BROOK J. INT'L L. 409, 411-412 (2003).
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they share the common objectives of promoting social harmonization
and increasing the economic prosperity of the citizens of the EU
member states.6 For the purposes of this Note, it is helpful to understand
the fundamental functions for which the Commission and the ECJ are
respectively responsible.
1. European Commission
To achieve its goals, the EU primarily relies upon its legislative
power. The Commission is the primary legislating body of the EU. It
has the authority to initiate two types of legislation. First, the
Commission can issue regulations, which have binding force upon all
member states without further action and preempt any conflicting
national law.7 Alternatively, it can set forth directives, which are not
enforceable until the member states enact implementing legislation
transposing the directives into national statutory law.8 By codifying
legislation as a directive, as opposed to a regulation, the EU allows each
Member State's national legislature to dictate the terms of the rule that
governs its citizens. 9 If a Member State fails to properly transpose a
directive into its national law, it faces liability for violating EU law.
1 °
2. European Court of Justice
The ECJ consists of fifteen Judges, with each Member State
appointing one of the judges." The ECJ's primary function is to
interpret and implement the Maastricht Treaty in order to ensure that the
European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the
European Parliament, and the member states comply with EU law.'
2
6. Gianluca Bacchiocci, Book Annotation, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 841, 841 (1996)
(reviewing BEHIND THE MYTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (ASH AMN & HHN TOMANEY, EDS.,
1995)); see also Jasmine Jordaan, Note, Proposal of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement: A Crucial Step in Establishing Long-Term Economic
Stability in Palestine and a Lasting Peace, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 555, 570-71 (1997).
7. Terry W. Conner et al., International Considerations in Licensing, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE PLI ORDER NUMBER GO-OBF, 762 PLIIPat 681, 762 (2003).
8. See id.; see also, Report of the International Energy Transactions Committee, 24
ENERGY L.J. 429, 433 (2003).
9. Thomas W. Reader, Comment, Is Self-Regulation the Best Option for the Advertising
Industry in the European Union? An Argument for the Harmonization of Advertising Laws
through the Continued Use of Directives, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 181, 212 (1995).
10. MATHIJSEN, supra note 3, at 29.
11. Id. at 126.
12. Id. at 124: see also, Kenneth M. Lord, Bootstrapping an Environmental Policy from an
Economic Covenant: The Teleological Approach of the European Court of Justice, 29 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 571, 574 (1996).
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The ECJ is able to perform this task by exercising either of two forms of
jurisdiction. The first type of jurisdiction is direct judicial control. When
utilizing such jurisdiction, the ECJ interprets a law and applies it to a
case before it. The second type of jurisdiction is indirect judicial
control. In utilizing such jurisdiction, the ECJ interprets a law at the
request of a Member State's national court, and the national court then
applies such interpretation to the pending litigation.
3
B. Case Law
In 1976 the Commission passed Council Directive 76/207/EEC
(Directive). The Commission stated the objective of the Directive in
Article 1(1): "The purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the
member states the principle of equal treatment for men and women as
regards access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational
training and as regards working conditions .... Article 2(1) adds,
"For the purposes of the following provisions, the 1rinciple of equal
treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on
grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to
marital or family status."
' 15
Despite the language of Article 2(1) mandating equality of
treatment, Article 2(4) carves out an enormous exception to the
prohibition on disparate treatment on the basis of gender. Article 2(4)
states: "This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to
promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by
removing existing inequalities which affect the opportunities of the
under-represented sex in the areas referred to in Article 1(1). '' 16 Article
2(4) allows for the possibility of gender-based discrimination in the
form of a positive action. Positive action encompasses "many different
measures and strategies which are undertaken in order to compensate
for past injustices suffered by women, by redressing current ine cualities
amongst men and women, primarily in an employment context. 17
In 1995, the ECJ limited the scope of positive action measures that
were authorized by Article 2(4). In Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt
Bremen, the ECJ ruled that a particular positive action program was not
13. GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 6 (1981).
14. Council Directive 76/207/EEC, art. 1(1), 1976 O.J. (L39) 40.
15. Id. art. 2(1), 1976 O.J. (L39) at 40.
16. Id. art. 2(4), 1976 O.J. (L39) at 40.
17. Katherine Cox, Positive Action in the European Union: From Kalanke to Marschall, 8
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 105 (1998).
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justified under Article 2(4) and thus violated Article 2(l).18 The ECJ
struck down the program because it guaranteed women absolute and
unconditional priority for promotions over equally qualified men.'
9
According to the ECJ, such unconditional guarantees were inconsistent
with the EU's goal of promoting equal opportunity for men and
women. 20
The ECJ's decision in Kalanke sparked legislative change. After
Kalanke, the Commission sought to amend Article 2(4) to restore the
validity of positive action measures, provided that the measures were
not rigid quotas and allowed for subjective elements to factor into hiring
as well as promotion decisions.2' In 1996, the Commission provided
more specific guidelines of which positive action programs Article 2(4)
would protect. The Commission added the following to Article 2(4):
"Possible measures shall include the giving of preference, as regards
access to employment or promotion, to a member of the under-
represented sex, provided that such measures do not preclude the
assessment of the particular circumstances of an individual case."22
By adding to the text of Article 2(4), the Commission-and, by
extension, the EU-made it clear that it would permit positive action
programs without rigid quotas. 23 The ECJ's decisions since the addition
to Article 2(4), including Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen24 and
Badeck v. Hessischer Ministerprdsident and Landesanwalt beim
Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen,25 reflect the EU's approach to
positive action measures. Both cases involved disputes regarding
positive action laws for public service appointment. The laws accorded
employment priority to women over men, where women were under-
represented at the level of the positions sought.
In Marschall, the ECJ upheld the program but attached a caveat to
its decision. Tempering its decision with boundaries, the ECJ required
18. Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Todd Joseph Koback, The Long, Hard Road to Amsterdam: Effects of Kalanke v. Freie
Hansestadt Bremen and the Treaty of Amsterdam on Positive Action and Gender Equality in
European Community Law, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 463, 483 (1999).
22. Id. at 463, 483-84.
23. Michelle I. Rozof, Overcoming Traditional Gender Stereotypes in the European Union:
The European Court of Justice's Ruling in Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 12
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1505, 1524 n. 107 (1998).
24. Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westphalen, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6394.
25. Case C-158/97, Badeck v. Hessischer Ministerprisident and Landesanwalt beim
Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1931, 1-1931 to 1-1932.
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the employer to take account of the criteria specific to the candidates
and to override the priority accorded to female candidates where one or
more of those criteria shifted the balance in favor of the male
candidate.26 Similarly, the ECJ in Badeck allowed the employer's
gender-based discriminatory policy, provided that the evaluation of the
applicants included an objective assessment which took account of the
specific personal situations of all candidates.27
III. THE LOMMERS CASE
A. Background Facts
In 1993, the Minister of Agriculture ("Minister"), who headed the
Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries
("Ministry"), enacted a program which governed access to the
Ministry's partially subsidized nursery scheme. The Minister adopted
Circular Number P 93-7841 ("Circular"), which stated: "In principle,
nursery places are available only to female employees of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, save in the case of an
emergency, to be determined by the Director., 28 By adopting the
Circular, the Minister sought to reverse the under-representation of
women within the Ministry. 29 A survey of the Ministry's employees
performed in 1994 revealed that women constituted approximately 25
percent of the workforce and were under-represented at senior levels.
30
In December 1995, Lommers, an employee of the Ministry, and
his wife, who worked elsewhere, were expecting a child. The Minister
rejected Lommers's request to reserve a nursery place for his child. This
rejection ultimately spawned a series of litigation which resulted in the
Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer in Visserij decision.
B. Procedural History
In December 1995, Lommers lodged a complaint with the
Minister. At the same time, Lommers asked the Commission for Equal
Treatment to give its opinion on the compatibility of the Minister's
position with the Wet Gelijke Behandeling van Mannen en Vrouwen
(WGB), a Netherlands national law. The WGB provided that a public
26. Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6394.
27. Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-1931 to 1-1932.
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service agency could only distinguish between men and women if it
intended the distinction to place women in a privileged position to
reduce inequalities and the distinction was reasonable to achieve such a
goal.31 The Commission for Equal Treatment struck down Lommers's
complaint under domestic law, determining that the Minister did not
violate the WGB.32 In September 1996, acting on the basis of the
Commission for Equal Treatment's opinion, the Minister rejected
Lommers's complaint.
33
Lommers appealed the Minister's decision to the
Arrondissementsrechtbank (District Court), but in October 1996 it too
endorsed the Commission for Equal Treatment's opinion.34 In
November 1996, Lommers appealed the District Court's decision to the
Centrale Raad van Beroep (Appellate Court).35 At this stage of the
litigation, Lommers raised the issue of EU law for the first time by
asserting that the Minister's program violated the Directive.3 6 The
Centrale Raad van Beroep determined that it could not decide the
compatibility of the Minister's program with the Directive on the basis
of the ECJ's case law, so it decided to stay proceedings and refer this
issue to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
37
C. The ECJ's Holding
The ECJ held that the Directive would not necessarily prevent the
Minister from enforcing the Circular. The validity of the program
depended on the results of a fact-finding investigation that the ECJ
referred to the Centrale Raad van Beroep.38 The ECJ made a threshold
determination, however, that in reserving places in the nursery
exclusively for the children of female employees, the Minister created a
difference of treatment on the grounds of gender, violating Article
2(1).
9
The ECJ next acknowledged that despite the Circular's
noncompliance with Article 2(1), the Circular could still be validly








38. See Id. 99 36-38.
39. Id. 930.
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Beroep's investigation led to affirmative answers to the following
inquiries: (1) whether the employment situation in the Ministry was
characterized by a significant under-representation of women and (2)
whether an insufficiency of suitable nursery facilities was more likely to
induce female employees to give up their jobs.40
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LOMMERS
A. Legal Analysis
The ECJ's decision was consistent with the Directive's statutory
goal of providing equal opportunity for women without imposing rigid
quotas. The ECJ's past decisions illustrated its willingness to allow
discriminatory programs when such programs were necessary to
provide for equal opportunity in situations where women were
historically disadvantaged, 41 and Lommers was no exception.
In Lommers the Minister intended the Circular to provide his
female employees with an advantage over their male counterparts in
order to reverse what the Minister perceived to be an under-
representation of women in his department. To determine if the facially
discriminatory Circular could have been a valid means of providing for
equal opportunity, the ECJ assigned a two-pronged factual inquiry to
the Centrale Raad van Beroep before resolving the case.
Marschall and Badeck both provided that Article 2(4) would only
authorize the positive action measures at issue in situations where
women were underrepresented in the particular workplace.42
Accordingly, the first line of inquiry was whether female employees
were underrepresented in the Ministry.
The second inquiry concerned causation. Specifically, the ECJ
asked whether the insufficiency of nursery facilities caused women to
give up their jobs.
Courts will strictly construe an attempt to enforce positive action
measures over individual rights, such as following Article 2(4) instead
of Article 2(1). 43 This standard implies that the provision concerned
should be an ultimate remedy in a particular situation.44 To establish
40. Id. 36-37.
41. See Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6394; Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1931.
42. See Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6394; Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-1931 to 1-1932.
43. See EVELYN ELLIS, EC SEX EQUALITY LAW 253 (1998).
44. See SACHA PRECHAL & NOREEN BURROwS, GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 112 (1990).
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that the Circular is an ultimate remedy to the under-representation of
women in the Ministry, the Minister should have to establish
causation-the lack of nursery positions contributed to the lack of
women in the workplace. Accordingly, the ECJ in Lommers correctly
added causation as a foundational requirement for Article 2(4).
B. Policy Analysis
Although the ECJ used sound legal analysis in reaching a decision
which on its face benefited women, the ECJ's holding will, in the long
run, likely harm women's interests in a manner that undermines the
purpose of the Directive. The detrimental effects of positive action
programs, like the initiative in Lommers, outweigh the benefits that such
programs produce.
Positive action programs have not provided a significant boost to
women despite their purported benefits. In the Second Medium-term
Community Programme for Women, the Commission investigated the
impact of positive action programs and stated that, despite the Equal
Treatment Directive, "women remain largely confined to traditional
occupations at fairly low levels. ' '4 5 The Commission has concluded that
economic and social measures adopted to produce greater gender
equality have failed to markedly improve women's opportunities.46 An
attempt to initiate positive action programs in Germany provided
another illustration of the minimal gains such initiatives produce. After
positive action programs had been in place in some German states for a
decade, the proportion of positions occupied by women increased by
less than 1 percent.47
Not only do positive action programs provide insignificant
benefits, they also produce substantial detrimental results. Positive
action programs, such as the initiative in Lommers, perpetuate negative
stereotypes about women in the workplace. The support European
women receive in caring for their young children has created the
perception that women are less dependable workers because they are
more likely to rely on others for assistance.48 Moreover, the Minister's
scheme could actually reinforce the traditional notions of the man in the
workplace and the woman as the homemaker. As the scheme only
45. Rozof, supra note 23, at 1531.
46. Id.
47. Steve Mazurana et al., Badeck, and Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, and Schnorbus v. Land
Hessen, European Court of Justice Decisions on Positive Action to Promote Employment of
Women, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 453, 460 (2002).
48. Rozof, supra note 23, at 1506 (1998).
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allows men to use the nursery for their children in emergency situations,
men will be more likely to rely upon their spouses to take care of their
children. This will likely preclude women from reaping the fruits of
employment. As a result, many of the gains women have made in the
workplace will be washed away.
C. Alternative Approaches
The ECJ followed the legal precedent established in Marschall and
Badeck, but it should have overruled these cases and used a different
approach in order to avoid the untoward consequences that result from
the Lommers decision. There were at least two possible legal
alternatives to the rule that the ECJ reaffirmed with its holding. These
alternatives offer viable and superior solutions to the issues with which
the ECJ grappled.
One alternative approach would have been for the ECJ to have
provided a more stringent set of requirements for the Minister's scheme
to be upheld. The ECJ determined it would allow the scheme if women
were under-represented in the Ministry and if the insufficiency of
nursery facilities generally contributed to female employees
relinquishing their jobs.49 This two-pronged inquiry left one critical
question unanswered: whether women would be more likely to work at
the Ministry if they had better access to nursery facilities.
This additional inquiry was critical in determining whether the
Minister's scheme was necessary. If the ECJ investigated potential
employment at the Ministry and found that the Minister's scheme would
raise the percentage of female employees, the Minister would be able to
make a more convincing argument for the necessity of the program.
Conversely, the opposite finding would tend to show that the scheme
would not be able to achieve its intended result and thus would have
little utility. As previously discussed, past positive action programs have
received criticism for yielding few, if any, improvements relative to
their target groups. The only way to know whether the Minister's
scheme would be different from ineffective positive action programs
that address but fail to reverse gender discrimination would be to
determine the scheme's specific impact on female employment
matriculation in the Ministry.
Another alternative approach the ECJ could have utilized in its
decision was a conditional validity scheme. In other words, the ECJ
49. Lommers, 36-37, at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/aide/index.htm.
[Vol. 26:469
Lommers v. Minister Van Landbouw
could have upheld the Minister's scheme on the condition that the
Ministry agreed to host awareness programs on gender issues for its
employees. One of the downsides of the Minister's scheme is that its net
effect might be a curtailment of women's advancement in the workplace
due to the likelihood that it will perpetuate the image of women in the
child rearing role. The Ministry could mitigate this negative aspect of its
scheme by educating its employees about the importance of women in
the workforce and why the positive action program is necessary. If the
ECJ had required the Ministry to host a seminar, distribute pamphlets,
or use some other method of communicating to its workforce the key
background facts of the Minister's scheme, the ECJ's decision to uphold
the positive action program would have enjoyed increased legitimacy.
D. Recommendation
Both of the alternative approaches discussed above propose
modified plans for upholding the Minister's scheme, but in Lommers the
most pragmatic solution would have been to strike down the scheme
altogether. Although the ECJ justifiably sought to advance the EU's
goal of providing equal opportunity in the workplace, it went about
achieving this goal without taking stock of another EU objective, that of
balancing the division of child care responsibilities between men and
women.
The Commission illustrated its support of the division of child care
responsibilities when it passed Council Recommendation 92/241/EEC
on childcare (Recommendation).50 The Commission passed the
Recommendation because it recognized an increase in the female labor
force without a corresponding decrease in women's family
responsibilities. 51 The Recommendation encouraged member states to
adopt initiatives in four areas: (1) child care programs, (2) special leave
arrangements for employed parents with child care responsibilities, (3)
employer responsiveness to the needs of workers with children, and (4)
the allocation of child care responsibilities between men and women.52
The fourth area anticipated efforts to create greater equality in the home
and less strain on female members of the workforce.53
50. Council Recommendation 92/241/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 123).
51. See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 267 (Philip Alston ed., Oxford
University Press 1999).
52. Council Recommendation 92/241/EEC, art. 2, 1992 O.J. (L 123).
53. See BARNARD, supra note 51, at 267.
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The objectives of the Recommendation are intertwined with the
goals of the Directive, and the irony of the ECJ's decision is that in
trying to further one interest, it actually hindered both. The scope of the
ECJ's analysis focused exclusively on the impact its ruling would have
on equal opportunity in the workplace. The ECJ paid no attention to the
fact that its decision defied the Recommendation by creating a family
structure that reduced male parental child care responsibilities. The
ECJ's violation of the Recommendation will perpetuate the traditional
separation of spousal duties, in which the man is responsible for earning
a living and the woman takes care of the home as well as the children.
Such a traditional responsibility dynamic will hamper women's career
opportunities, thereby undermining one of the principal goals of the
Directive.
The emphasis on women being responsible for child care duties
will hurt female prospects in the employment arena in two ways. First,
it will force many women to abandon partially or fully their careers in
order to spend more time looking after their children. Second, women
who continue to work will be viewed by their employers in a more
negative light than their male counterparts, for whom work is the
primary responsibility.
The ECJ should have reached a decision that avoided these
untoward results. Any provision which gives women preferential
treatment over their male counterparts for access to child care facilities
will inevitably hinder the movement toward balancing parental
responsibilities and consequently undermine efforts to level the playing
field in the workplace. Just such a provision was at issue in Lommers,
and in rendering its decision, the ECJ should have looked at the policy
considerations that drove existing EU legislation. Given the violations
of EU law highlighted by such policy considerations, the ECJ should
have struck down the Circular.
V. CONCLUSION
In Lommers the ECJ faced the decision of whether to uphold the
Ministry's Circular, a positive action program facially designed to
reverse the under representation of women in the Ministry's
employment ranks. Under Article 2(1) of the Directive, all
discriminatory measures, including positive action programs, are
prohibited. Article 2(4) sets forth a strictly construed exception to
Article 2(1), however. Under Article 2(4), courts may allow for positive
action measures that seek to provide equal opportunity for an under-
represented class, but not to the extent of imposing a rigid quota.
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Pursuant to its legal roadmap, the ECJ adopted the standard that
the Circular would be valid if it helped give women an equal
opportunity to work in the Ministry. In reaching its verdict, the ECJ
focused heavily on legal precedent and paid little attention to public
policy. The ECJ failed to foresee the wide-reaching impact of its
holding. The ECJ's decision will most certainly lead to a greater
emphasis on women handling the bulk of child care duties. As a result
of this increased responsibility in the family, women's employment
prospects will diminish. Such results will conflict with the Directive's
mandate of equal treatment in the workplace.
Through a more thorough review of public policy concerns, the
ECJ could and should have noticed the practical flaws in its abstract and
somewhat nearsighted conclusion that the Minister's scheme was
consistent with the EU's objectives. The theoretical set of legal
dynamics created by the Ministry's Circular may have looked tranquil,
but in reality they will catalyze a reactionary undertow of gender-biased
discrimination. The ECJ should have overruled previous decisions and
struck down the Minister's program. Ultimately, that is the decision that
would have produced the most positive result for women, and that is the
decision that would have led to greater equality.
By Brady Mitchell
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